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Introduction	  Many	  policy	  analyses	  or	  news	  stories	  often	  deal	  with	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  policies	  that	  are	  well	  intentioned,	  but	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  full	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  and	  effects.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  those	  stories.	  Crop	  insurance	  has	  become	  an	  important	  part	  of	  farm	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  This	  paper	  is	  concerned	  specifically	  with	  the	  unforeseen	  effects	  that	  crop	  insurance	  provided	  to	  farmers	  may	  have	  on	  other	  decisions	  they	  may	  make.	  Specifically,	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  insurance	  program	  has	  on	  water	  use.	  The	  effect	  that	  a	  taxpayer	  funded	  policy	  has	  on	  the	  sustainable	  use	  of	  a	  vital	  resource	  should	  be	  of	  concern	  to	  all.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  questions	  any	  society	  has	  to	  determine	  is	  how	  to	  feed	  its	  population.	  This	  has	  been	  particularly	  important	  since	  the	  global	  baby	  boom	  around	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  Food	  production	  has	  changed	  rapidly	  over	  the	  past	  century	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  it	  has	  become	  more	  industrialized,	  allowing	  greater	  yields	  to	  feed	  a	  growing	  population	  (Vandermeer	  2011).	  Various	  congresses	  have	  passed	  and	  various	  presidents	  have	  enacted	  many	  policies	  and	  tools	  that	  to	  maintain	  an	  adequate	  food	  supply	  while	  also	  dealing	  with	  some	  of	  the	  variability	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  agriculture.	  Because	  agriculture	  accounts	  for	  about	  45%	  of	  the	  total	  land	  area	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (World	  Bank	  2014),	  actions	  that	  are	  taken	  by	  farmers	  have	  important	  consequences	  for	  our	  environment	  as	  a	  whole.	  Furthermore,	  as	  producers	  of	  the	  food	  we	  eat	  and	  the	  fibers	  we	  wear,	  and	  as	  users	  of	  the	  land	  we	  love	  and	  the	  water	  we	  need,	  agriculture	  has	  vitally	  important	  and	  complex	  interactions	  with	  the	  environment	  that	  are	  important	  to	  understand.	  
	   2	  
Sustainable	  production	  of	  our	  food	  and	  cotton,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  policies	  that	  govern	  this	  level	  of	  production	  should	  be	  of	  great	  concern	  for	  all.	  Crop	  insurance	  is	  one	  of	  these	  key	  tools	  that	  we	  use	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  help	  support	  farmers,	  and	  one	  that	  has	  increased	  dramatically	  in	  recent	  decades	  as	  a	  program	  thanks	  to	  generous	  subsidies	  (Environmental	  Working	  Group	  2012).	  Any	  effect	  that	  it	  has	  on	  water	  use,	  positive	  or	  negative,	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  sustainability,	  not	  only	  of	  the	  freshwater	  resource,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  grow	  food	  and	  fiber.	  	  Freshwater	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  resources	  on	  our	  planet.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  tempting	  to	  think	  of	  water	  as	  a	  renewable	  resource	  because	  of	  its	  well-­‐known	  cycle	  through	  the	  environment.	  Simplified	  diagrams	  show	  water	  evaporating	  from	  the	  ocean,	  precipitating	  on	  land,	  and	  then	  flowing	  back	  to	  the	  ocean	  to	  complete	  the	  cycle.	  Even	  more	  complex	  diagrams	  ultimately	  show	  a	  closed	  loop.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  well	  understood	  that	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  this	  water	  is	  usable	  as	  a	  potable	  source.	  Freshwater	  accounts	  for	  less	  than	  3%	  of	  all	  water	  on	  the	  planet	  (NOAA	  2014).	  When	  we	  disregard	  the	  water	  that	  is	  contained	  in	  polar	  ice	  caps	  (because	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  we	  will	  use	  that	  water	  for	  drinking	  or	  farming,	  despite	  some	  farfetched	  plans	  to	  transport	  icebergs	  (Madrigal	  2011)),	  only	  30%	  of	  that	  3%,	  or	  about	  0.9%,	  is	  available	  in	  the	  form	  of	  groundwater	  or	  surface	  water	  (NOAA	  2014).	  Often	  these	  sources,	  especially	  groundwater,	  are	  not	  replenished	  as	  fast	  as	  they	  are	  being	  diminished	  through	  water	  withdrawals.	  Estimates	  are	  that	  over	  three	  quarters	  of	  the	  world’s	  groundwater	  supplies	  are	  nonrenewable	  (Jackson	  et	  al.	  2003).	  In	  this	  context,	  nonrenewable	  means	  that	  the	  time	  it	  would	  take	  to	  replenish	  if	  we	  stopped	  extracting	  water	  would	  be	  over	  one	  century.	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This	  problem	  of	  freshwater	  scarcity	  is	  made	  more	  complex	  because	  the	  fundamental	  importance	  of	  water	  makes	  it	  so	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  right.	  Farmers	  in	  the	  Central	  Valley	  of	  California	  were	  recently	  upset	  by	  a	  law	  that	  set	  up	  groundwater	  pumping	  restrictions,	  with	  representatives	  claiming	  that	  it	  removed	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  water	  that	  once	  belonged	  solely	  to	  the	  farmer	  (Nielson	  2014).	  	  Farmers	  are	  reluctant	  to	  have	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  them	  or	  pay	  fees	  for	  the	  use	  of	  what	  they	  see	  as	  their	  water,	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  a	  market	  to	  do	  what	  it	  does	  best,	  and	  efficiently	  allocate	  this	  scarce	  resource.	  How	  we	  use	  this	  resource	  now	  will	  affect	  how	  much	  will	  be	  available	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  Agriculture	  currently	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  80	  percent	  of	  all	  water	  consumed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  31	  percent	  of	  all	  water	  withdrawals	  (water	  used	  for	  cooling	  in	  thermoelectric	  power	  plants	  primarily	  account	  for	  this	  difference)	  (Schaible	  and	  Aillery	  2012).	  As	  the	  largest	  consumer	  of	  water,	  any	  policy	  that	  may	  impact	  water	  use	  in	  this	  sector	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  have	  a	  large	  overall	  impact	  water	  use	  overall.	  Almost	  half	  of	  all	  crop	  revenue	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  generated	  from	  the	  roughly	  16	  percent	  of	  cropland	  that	  is	  irrigated	  (Aillery	  2004).	  Water	  is	  a	  common	  access	  resource,	  meaning	  that	  the	  use	  of	  it	  by	  one	  farmer	  affects	  the	  ability	  for	  other	  farmers	  to	  use	  it	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future.	  From	  an	  agronomic	  perspective,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  get	  the	  most	  value	  per	  unit	  of	  water	  that	  is	  used,	  while	  conserving	  for	  future	  use.	  Unfortunately,	  if	  a	  farmer	  makes	  more	  money	  because	  of	  higher	  overall	  production	  by	  growing	  a	  crop	  that	  uses	  more	  water	  per	  dollar	  value,	  then	  he	  or	  she	  will	  not	  be	  incentivized	  to	  switch	  production,	  all	  else	  equal.	  In	  California	  in	  2005,	  for	  example,	  revenues	  from	  rice	  were	  valued	  at	  $31	  per	  acre-­‐foot	  of	  water	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used,	  whereas	  other	  field	  crops	  generated	  $375	  per	  acre-­‐foot	  of	  water	  (Hanak	  2011).	  Farmers	  are	  not	  seeking	  to	  maximize	  profit	  per	  unit	  of	  water,	  only	  profit.	  By	  not	  paying	  for	  the	  full	  true	  cost	  of	  water	  (which	  includes	  the	  potential	  future	  use)	  farmers	  are	  imposing	  a	  negative	  externality	  on	  future	  and	  concurrent	  users	  of	  that	  water,	  who	  might	  have	  other	  more	  efficient	  uses	  of	  the	  water.	  This	  example	  demonstrates	  the	  effect	  that	  policy,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  can	  have	  on	  water	  use.	  The	  effect	  that	  crop	  insurance	  has	  on	  the	  use	  of	  water	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  subtle,	  though	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  may	  have	  some	  influence	  on	  cropping	  decisions	  (i.e.	  how	  much	  and	  what	  to	  grow).	  Crop	  insurance	  is	  inherently	  linked	  to	  water	  in	  that	  many	  of	  the	  risks	  that	  it	  insures	  against	  are	  water	  related,	  either	  through	  drought	  or	  flood.	  Crop	  insurance	  has	  been	  provided	  in	  the	  United	  States	  since	  the	  New	  Deal.	  It	  was	  first	  promoted	  as	  an	  experiment	  to	  help	  farmers	  after	  the	  Dust	  Bowl	  and	  the	  Great	  Depression	  for	  major	  crops	  in	  major	  producing	  areas	  (RMA	  2014a).	  	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Crop	  Insurance	  Reform	  Act	  of	  1994	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  farmers	  started	  to	  enroll	  as	  a	  result	  of	  generous	  subsidies	  and	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  area	  and	  crops	  covered.	  Before	  this	  law	  was	  passed,	  many	  farmers	  were	  supported	  by	  ad	  hoc	  disaster	  relief	  (Williams	  et	  al.	  1993),	  which	  shifted	  the	  cost	  of	  insurance	  onto	  everyone	  else,	  and	  created	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  when	  aid	  would	  be	  given.	  According	  to	  a	  2013	  congressional	  report,	  even	  up	  until	  2008,	  disaster	  payments	  were	  still	  somewhat	  routine,	  so	  that	  Congress	  tried	  to	  further	  expand	  access	  to	  insurance	  programs	  to	  uncovered	  farmers	  in	  the	  2008	  Farm	  Bill	  (Shields	  2013).	  Since	  then,	  insurance	  levels	  have	  increased,	  and	  disaster	  payments	  have	  decreased.	  In	  2012,	  around	  86%	  of	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insurable	  cropland	  was	  insured,	  equivalent	  to	  282	  million	  acres	  (O’Donoghue	  2013).	  That	  is	  an	  increase	  from	  just	  82	  million	  acres	  20	  years	  earlier.	  The	  study	  of	  any	  unintended	  consequences,	  big	  or	  small,	  of	  such	  a	  large	  and	  fast	  growing	  program,	  is	  an	  important	  task.	  	  	   Just	  as	  other	  insurance	  markets	  face	  the	  issue	  of	  moral	  hazard,	  the	  concern	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  whether	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  moral	  hazard	  in	  the	  crop	  insurance	  market,	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  water	  use.	  Moral	  hazard	  occurs	  when	  an	  insured	  party	  engages	  in	  riskier	  behavior	  that	  he	  or	  she	  would	  not	  have	  engaged	  before	  he	  or	  she	  was	  insured.	  This	  may	  be	  especially	  pronounced	  because	  insurance	  is	  subsidized.	  Moral	  hazard	  in	  crop	  insurance,	  if	  it	  exists,	  has	  potential	  environmental	  impacts	  through	  chemical	  use,	  resource	  use,	  or	  land	  use.	  Some	  work	  has	  already	  been	  done	  to	  look	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  insurance	  on	  farmers’	  decisions	  about	  levels	  chemical	  inputs.	  	  	   The	  oft-­‐cited	  paper	  in	  this	  area	  by	  Horowitz	  and	  Lichtenberg	  (1993)	  finds	  that	  chemical	  input	  use	  of	  all	  kinds,	  pesticides	  and	  fertilizers,	  increases	  with	  levels	  of	  insurance.	  This,	  of	  course,	  is	  undesirable	  from	  an	  environmental	  perspective	  because	  of	  the	  impacts	  that	  these	  chemicals	  often	  have	  downstream.	  They	  contend	  that	  chemical	  inputs	  increase	  yield	  while	  also	  increasing	  the	  variability	  of	  yields.	  This	  is	  the	  context	  in	  which	  moral	  hazard	  occurs:	  the	  reduction	  of	  risk	  because	  of	  the	  insurance	  incentivizes	  farmers	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  involves	  more	  risk,	  but	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  greater	  benefits.	  	  	   The	  impact	  that	  crop	  insurance	  has	  on	  input	  use,	  however,	  is	  not	  a	  settled	  debate.	  Smith	  and	  Goodwin	  (1996)	  counter	  the	  theory	  and	  empirics	  behind	  the	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argument	  laid	  out	  by	  Horowitz	  and	  Lichtenberg.	  To	  Smith	  and	  Goodwin,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  increasing	  inputs	  after	  being	  insured	  is	  counterintuitive	  because	  fertilizers	  and	  pesticides	  would	  decrease	  the	  probability	  that	  yields	  would	  fall	  below	  the	  threshold	  that	  would	  result	  in	  indemnities.	  Using	  empirical	  evidence	  from	  Kansas,	  they	  show	  that	  chemical	  inputs	  on	  winter	  wheat	  crops	  decreased	  with	  insurance.	  This	  is	  still	  an	  example	  of	  moral	  hazard	  because	  behavior	  changes	  in	  response	  to	  the	  participation	  in	  the	  insurance	  program,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  a	  direction	  that	  is	  far	  more	  agreeable	  to	  environmentalists	  because	  a	  decrease	  in	  fertilizer	  and	  pesticide	  use	  leads	  to	  less	  nutrient	  loading	  and	  water	  pollution	  (Tilman	  et	  al.	  2002).	  Using	  a	  slightly	  different	  model	  and	  a	  different	  set	  of	  data,	  Zhong,	  Ning,	  and	  Xing	  (2006)	  find	  a	  similar	  relationship.	  They	  assume	  that	  input	  use	  affects	  the	  decision	  to	  enroll	  in	  crop	  insurance	  (note	  that	  their	  data	  comes	  from	  China,	  which	  has	  different	  policies	  about	  crop	  insurance,	  though	  are	  still	  suggestive	  of	  possible	  effects	  in	  the	  US).	  Use	  of	  pesticides	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  farmer	  enrolled	  in	  crop	  insurance,	  while	  use	  of	  fertilizers	  increase	  this	  likelihood.	  Different	  inputs	  interacted	  with	  the	  insurance	  program	  in	  different	  ways.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  moral	  hazard	  decisions	  due	  to	  crop	  insurance	  with	  a	  different	  decision	  timeframe.	  Wu	  (1999)	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  this	  moral	  hazard	  question	  by	  looking	  at	  land	  use	  changes	  before	  and	  after	  enrollment	  in	  crop	  insurance	  programs.	  He	  finds	  that	  insurance	  tends	  to	  encourage	  farmers	  to	  change	  their	  planting	  patterns	  in	  a	  way	  that	  shifts	  away	  from	  less	  intensive	  pastoral	  land	  to	  more	  intensive	  cropland,	  with	  clear	  environmental	  implications.	  Intensive	  agriculture	  increases	  the	  nutrient	  and	  toxin	  levels	  in	  surrounding	  bodies	  of	  water	  due	  to	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increased	  fertilizer	  and	  pesticide	  use,	  increased	  water	  use,	  and	  soil	  degradation	  (Tilman	  et	  al.	  2002).	  Very	  few	  studies	  have	  looked	  specifically	  into	  the	  effect	  that	  crop	  insurance	  may	  have	  on	  the	  use	  of	  water	  resources,	  despite	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  this	  resource	  (O’Connor	  2013;	  Hook	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Dalton	  et	  al.	  2004).	  	  A	  hypothetical	  farmer	  who	  uses	  crop	  insurance	  may	  will	  feel	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  faced	  with	  less	  risk	  overall,	  and	  therefore	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  risk	  at	  the	  margin.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  use	  less	  of	  the	  inputs,	  including	  water,	  that	  they	  may	  otherwise	  use	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  their	  risk	  (Smith	  and	  Goodwin	  2006;	  Zhong,	  Ning,	  and	  Xing	  2006).	  	  As	  water	  becomes	  scarcer	  in	  some	  regions	  due	  to	  climate	  change,	  any	  policy	  that	  inadvertently	  changes	  the	  way	  that	  farmers	  use	  water—positively	  or	  negatively—will	  be	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  our	  future	  ability	  to	  use	  stores	  of	  water.	  	  To	  measure	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  United	  States	  crop	  insurance	  program	  on	  water	  use,	  this	  paper	  will	  use	  county-­‐level	  data	  from	  Texas.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  focus	  is	  threefold.	  First	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  convenience:	  the	  Texas	  Water	  Development	  Board	  provides	  county	  level	  data	  on	  irrigation	  water	  use	  by	  crop	  for	  the	  period	  of	  time	  between	  1985	  through	  2012.	  This	  is	  especially	  helpful	  because	  it	  spans	  the	  period	  in	  which	  insurance	  rates	  rose	  dramatically.	  Texas	  is	  additionally	  a	  good	  source	  of	  data	  in	  that	  it	  is	  comprised	  of	  254	  counties,	  so	  data	  is	  relatively	  granulated	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  states	  like	  California	  with	  only	  58	  counties.	  Finally,	  Texas	  is	  an	  important	  agricultural	  state,	  accounting	  for	  about	  7%	  of	  total	  land	  area	  and	  water	  use	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  producing	  over	  $20	  billion	  in	  agricultural	  products	  in	  2011	  (Gleaton	  and	  Robinson	  2013).	  	  Water	  is	  also	  not	  a	  trivial	  issue	  in	  Texas,	  which	  has	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faced	  several	  droughts	  during	  the	  roughly	  three	  recent	  decades	  that	  are	  analyzed	  in	  this	  study.	  This	  concern	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  the	  future	  era	  of	  possibly	  increasing	  drought	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  due	  to	  climate	  change.	  	  Before	  looking	  into	  the	  data,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  a	  have	  background	  on	  crop	  insurance	  policies	  and	  their	  history	  as	  well	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  crop	  insurance	  and	  agricultural	  industry.	  I	  will	  then	  review	  in	  greater	  depth	  the	  relevant	  literature	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  moral	  hazard	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  crop	  insurance.	  Following	  this	  will	  be	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  data,	  model	  specifications,	  and	  empirical	  results,	  followed	  by	  a	  conclusion.	  	  Background	  	   Crop	  insurance	  is	  a	  financial	  tool	  that	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  insurance.	  People	  who	  are	  risk	  averse	  (which	  describes	  most	  people;	  all	  people	  if	  one	  assumes	  diminishing	  marginal	  utility	  of	  income)	  are	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  actuarially	  unfair	  insurance	  agreement.	  That	  is,	  a	  risk	  averse	  individual	  is	  willing	  to	  pay	  a	  premium	  to	  avoid	  risk	  and	  increase	  certainty.	  Insurance	  companies,	  as	  risk	  neutral	  entities,	  are	  usually	  willing	  to	  provide	  this	  service.	  There	  are	  two	  complicating	  factors:	  adverse	  selection	  and	  moral	  hazard.	  Adverse	  selection	  occurs	  when	  the	  individual	  knows	  more	  than	  the	  insurance	  agency.	  This	  can	  cause	  problems	  because	  the	  insurance	  company	  may	  be	  providing	  coverage	  that	  is	  riskier	  than	  it	  is	  prepared	  cover.	  To	  deal	  with	  this	  problem,	  insurance	  agents	  try	  to	  get	  as	  much	  information	  as	  they	  can	  on	  the	  person	  or	  entity	  to	  be	  insured.	  Another	  way	  of	  managing	  this	  unknown	  risk	  is	  to	  cover	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  individuals	  with	  uncorrelated	  risks.	  By	  doing	  this,	  the	  insurer	  can	  slightly	  diminish	  the	  problem	  of	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adverse	  selection.	  This	  helps	  to	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  a	  private	  crop	  insurance	  market	  without	  government	  help.	  	  Moral	  hazard	  is	  one	  of	  the	  other	  major	  concerns	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  almost	  any	  insurance	  market.	  Moral	  hazard	  occurs	  when	  the	  insured	  party	  engages	  in	  riskier	  behavior	  because	  he	  or	  she	  is	  insured.	  This	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  concern	  in	  this	  paper,	  especially	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  agriculture,	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  risk	  to	  the	  farmer	  and	  the	  insurer,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  environmental	  externalities	  that	  relate	  to	  farmers’	  decisions.	  	  Because	  the	  problems	  that	  are	  present	  in	  other	  insurance	  markets	  are	  perhaps	  more	  pronounced	  in	  the	  crop	  insurance	  market—most	  notably	  the	  high	  correlation	  of	  catastrophic	  risk	  across	  areas	  due	  to	  natural	  disasters—a	  private	  market	  was	  very	  hard	  to	  establish.	  If	  a	  wide	  scale	  drought	  affected	  many	  farmers	  in	  a	  given	  year,	  an	  insurance	  company	  would	  have	  to	  make	  many	  payouts	  at	  one	  time,	  potentially	  ruining	  the	  company	  financially.	  In	  1938,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Dust	  Bowl	  and	  Depression	  effects	  on	  agriculture,	  the	  United	  States	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Agricultural	  Adjustment	  Act,	  establishing	  the	  Federal	  Crop	  Insurance	  Corporation	  (FCIC)	  (National	  Crop	  Insurance	  Services	  2014;	  RMA	  2014a).	  During	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  program,	  the	  FCIC	  offered	  pilot	  plans	  that	  remained	  very	  limited	  in	  scope.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Federal	  Crop	  Insurance	  Act	  of	  1980	  that	  crop	  insurance	  spread	  in	  a	  significant	  way.	  That	  law	  was	  designed	  to	  encourage	  more	  farmers	  to	  enroll	  in	  crop	  insurance	  by	  removing	  the	  assistance	  that	  had	  been	  provided	  in	  cases	  of	  natural	  disaster.	  If	  farmers	  knew	  they	  were	  essentially	  insured	  for	  risk	  of	  natural	  disaster	  by	  the	  disaster	  payments	  from	  the	  federal	  government,	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there	  was	  far	  less	  of	  an	  incentive	  for	  them	  to	  enroll	  in	  additional	  crop	  insurance	  programs	  (Shields	  2013).	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  removing	  the	  funding	  for	  disaster	  coverage	  from	  the	  farm	  bills	  (though	  Congress	  continued	  to	  pass	  ad	  hoc	  disaster	  relief),	  the	  Federal	  Crop	  Insurance	  Act	  of	  1980	  offered	  30	  percent	  premium	  subsidy	  for	  coverage	  up	  to	  65	  percent	  (National	  Crop	  Insurance	  Services	  2014).	  The	  crop	  insurance	  system	  was	  revised	  once	  again	  in	  1994	  to	  increase	  subsidies	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  increasing	  insurance	  participation	  to	  a	  level	  at	  which	  disaster	  relief	  would	  not	  need	  to	  be	  provided.	  The	  issue	  that	  many	  policymakers	  were	  concerned	  with	  regarding	  disaster	  relief	  administered	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  was	  that	  all	  taxpayers	  felt	  the	  burden.	  By	  increasing	  enrollment	  in	  crop	  insurance	  programs,	  more	  of	  that	  burden	  was	  also	  shouldered	  by	  the	  farmers	  themselves.	  This	  was	  also	  politically	  popular	  in	  that	  it	  provided	  a	  service	  to	  farmers	  at	  a	  discounted	  rate.	  The	  other	  significant	  change	  in	  crop	  insurance	  policy	  that	  brought	  about	  this	  rapid	  expansion	  came	  in	  2000,	  when	  the	  Agricultural	  Risk	  Protection	  Act	  again	  significantly	  increased	  the	  subsidies	  of	  insurance	  premiums.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  coverage	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  related	  government	  policies	  that	  promoted	  this	  change.	  Such	  rapid	  growth	  of	  such	  a	  large	  program	  in	  a	  vital	  industry	  warrants	  interest	  in	  possible	  side	  effects.	  Before	  we	  look	  into	  some	  of	  these	  possible	  side	  effects,	  positive	  or	  negative,	  especially	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  agricultural	  water	  use,	  we	  must	  first	  understand	  the	  actual	  structure	  of	  some	  of	  the	  insurance	  policies.	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   Multiple	  peril	  crop	  insurance	  is	  the	  most	  common	  type	  of	  policy,	  which	  insures	  for	  all	  types	  of	  natural	  disasters:	  from	  frost	  and	  hail	  to	  disease	  and	  drought.	  Farmers	  are	  able	  to	  choose	  what	  level	  of	  insurance	  he	  or	  she	  wants	  between	  50	  and	  85	  percent	  yield	  loss	  (RMA	  2014b).	  Losses	  are	  calculated	  based	  on	  average	  historical	  yields.	  The	  more	  he	  or	  she	  insures,	  the	  more	  it	  will	  cost.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  farmer	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  insure	  100	  percent	  of	  his	  or	  her	  crops	  makes	  sure	  that	  the	  farmer	  is	  still	  bearing	  some	  of	  the	  risk,	  and	  protects	  insurers	  against	  slight	  variations	  in	  yields.	  The	  farmer	  can	  also	  choose	  the	  predicted	  price	  at	  which	  to	  insure	  his	  or	  her	  crops.	  If	  he	  or	  she	  insures	  at	  a	  100	  percent	  of	  the	  predicted	  price,	  the	  cost	  will	  be	  greater	  than	  being	  insured	  at	  a	  smaller	  percentage	  of	  the	  predicted	  price.	  The	  clearest	  way	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  policies	  work	  is	  through	  an	  example.	  If	  your	  farm	  had	  a	  production	  history	  of	  150	  bushels	  per	  acre,	  and	  you	  chose	  a	  coverage	  level	  of	  70	  percent,	  then	  if	  your	  yields	  fell	  below	  105	  bushels	  per	  acre	  (150*0.70),	  then	  you	  would	  be	  paid	  the	  difference,	  times	  whatever	  price	  you	  had	  agreed	  to.	  If	  yield	  fell	  to	  90	  bushels	  per	  acre,	  and	  you	  agreed	  to	  a	  price	  of	  $2	  per	  bushel,	  then	  you	  would	  be	  paid	  (105-­‐90)*2	  =	  $30	  per	  acre	  (adapted	  from	  Edwards	  2013).	  	  Farmers	  can	  also	  enroll	  in	  catastrophic	  coverage	  at	  50	  percent	  yields	  and	  55	  percent	  of	  the	  predicted	  price	  for	  a	  small	  administrative	  fee	  ($100)	  with	  the	  premium	  paid	  for	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  (RMA	  2014b).	  Mechanistically,	  private	  companies	  that	  are	  approved	  by	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Agency’s	  (a	  branch	  of	  the	  USDA)	  Federal	  Crop	  Insurance	  Corporation	  provide	  insurance	  (the	  federal	  government	  technically	  acts	  as	  a	  reinsurance	  agent,	  backing	  up	  these	  private	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insurers).	  These	  companies	  then	  base	  premiums	  on	  the	  Actual	  Production	  History	  (APH)	  or	  the	  Actual	  Revenue	  History	  (ARH),	  determined	  from	  between	  four	  and	  ten	  years	  of	  historical	  data,	  adjusted	  for	  trends	  and	  dropping	  bad	  years.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  for	  farmers	  who	  are	  transitioning	  from	  growing	  one	  crop	  to	  growing	  another,	  or	  that	  have	  less	  than	  four	  years	  of	  production	  history,	  the	  RMA	  uses	  what	  are	  called	  transitional	  yields,	  which	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  average	  historical	  yield	  of	  the	  county	  in	  which	  the	  farm	  resides.	  	  Production	  history	  is	  then	  calculated	  based	  on	  75%	  of	  the	  transition	  yield	  for	  years	  in	  which	  no	  actual	  production	  history	  exists	  (RMA	  2014b).	  	   The	  other	  major	  crop	  insurance	  program	  is	  the	  Group	  Risk	  Plan	  (GRP),	  which	  uses	  county	  level	  data	  to	  insure	  widespread	  losses	  due	  to	  natural	  disasters.	  A	  farmer	  can	  choose	  the	  level	  at	  which	  an	  indemnity	  (payout)	  is	  paid	  should	  area	  yields,	  as	  opposed	  to	  personal	  yields,	  fall	  below	  that	  level.	  There	  are	  many	  other	  types	  of	  plans,	  and	  individual	  plans	  vary	  based	  on	  the	  farmer’s	  choice	  and	  what	  crop	  they	  are	  growing	  (over	  100	  are	  coverable).	  Many	  of	  the	  small	  details	  of	  the	  plans	  are	  designed	  to	  try	  to	  get	  as	  much	  information	  as	  possible	  so	  that	  insurers	  can	  do	  their	  best	  to	  avoid	  adverse	  selection,	  as	  noted	  above.	  	  The	  issue	  of	  moral	  hazard	  is	  harder	  to	  grapple	  with.	  Moral	  hazard	  deals	  with	  how	  behavior	  changes	  after	  insurance	  is	  provided,	  so	  it	  is	  much	  harder	  from	  a	  technical	  perspective	  to	  monitor	  and	  enforce	  possible	  limits	  on	  this	  behavior,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  know	  exactly	  how	  behavior	  may	  change.	  There	  are	  rules	  that	  prevent	  the	  most	  blatant	  examples	  of	  moral	  hazard.	  For	  instance,	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  enrollment	  period	  that	  ends	  before	  crops	  are	  planted,	  after	  which	  farmers	  cannot	  buy	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insurance.	  That	  way,	  if	  something	  happens	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  growing	  season,	  they	  cannot	  quickly	  decide	  to	  enroll	  in	  the	  insurance	  program	  just	  to	  reap	  the	  payout	  without	  paying	  the	  full	  premium.	  	  Other	  possible	  moral	  hazard	  effects,	  such	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  increased	  water	  use	  that	  is	  analyzed	  in	  this	  paper,	  cannot	  be	  so	  easily	  controlled	  for.	  The	  use	  of	  irrigation	  water	  varies	  widely	  by	  state.	  In	  some	  states,	  such	  as	  Iowa,	  which	  is	  not	  very	  dry,	  most	  crops	  are	  rain	  fed,	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  use	  much	  irrigation.	  Because	  water	  is	  less	  scarce,	  they	  can	  reasonably	  count	  on	  rainfall	  to	  feed	  their	  thirsty	  crops,	  and	  can	  benefit	  from	  insurance	  when	  those	  crops	  fail	  because	  of	  either	  too	  much	  or	  too	  little	  water.	  Texas,	  a	  state	  that	  relies	  mostly	  on	  groundwater	  for	  irrigation	  (about	  75%),	  accounts	  for	  about	  6%	  of	  total	  freshwater	  withdrawals	  in	  the	  US	  (Kenny	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Given	  its	  size	  and	  relative	  importance	  in	  terms	  of	  agriculture,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  recent	  drought	  and	  reliance	  on	  irrigation,	  Texas	  provides	  a	  good	  test	  case	  to	  analyze	  factors	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  demand	  for	  water.	  	  Because	  this	  paper’s	  primary	  concern	  relates	  to	  water	  use	  in	  Texas,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  also	  understand	  rules	  governing	  water	  allocation	  in	  Texas.	  Texas	  has	  what	  is	  called	  “absolute	  ownership,”	  in	  that	  property	  owners	  have	  the	  right	  to	  the	  groundwater	  beneath	  their	  property.	  They	  are	  permitted	  to	  pump	  the	  water	  and	  for	  “reasonable	  use,”	  with	  very	  few	  limits	  provided	  that	  they	  do	  not	  intentionally	  try	  to	  harm	  their	  neighbors	  (Kaiser	  2014).	  Because	  water	  is	  not	  priced	  in	  Texas,	  the	  only	  cost	  of	  water	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  transporting	  it	  from	  a	  source	  to	  the	  crops.	  For	  groundwater,	  this	  amounts	  to	  mostly	  pumping	  costs,	  amounting	  to	  roughly	  20	  to	  45	  dollars	  per	  1000	  acre-­‐feet	  (Kanazawa	  1992).	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With	  such	  limited	  restrictions	  on	  how	  much	  water	  farmers	  may	  use,	  the	  question	  what	  policies	  may	  encourage	  or	  discourage	  sustainable	  use	  are	  more	  pressing.	  Only	  a	  few	  counties,	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  North	  Plains	  Groundwater	  Conservation	  District	  that	  overlies	  the	  Ogallala	  Aquifer	  and	  those	  that	  overlie	  the	  Edwards	  Aquifer,	  have	  any	  limit	  to	  groundwater	  pumping	  been	  instituted	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Texas.	  	  Literature	  Review	  	  
Factors	  affecting	  water	  use.	  Because	  groundwater	  is	  a	  valuable	  and	  limited	  resource,	  a	  lot	  of	  research	  has	  gone	  into	  trying	  to	  define	  what	  constitutes	  an	  efficient	  use	  of	  water	  for	  crops.	  Water	  productivity,	  usually	  defined	  as	  the	  yield	  per	  unit	  of	  water,	  is	  usually	  the	  way	  agronomists	  conceptualize	  water	  use	  efficiency	  (Cai	  and	  Rosegrant	  2003).	  Because	  we	  generally	  assume	  a	  diminishing	  marginal	  product	  of	  water,	  much	  like	  other	  inputs,	  there	  comes	  a	  point	  at	  which	  the	  addition	  of	  another	  unit	  of	  water	  is	  wasteful	  compared	  to	  its	  potential	  for	  future	  use.	  If	  water	  were	  an	  infinitely	  available	  resource,	  we	  would	  not	  care	  much	  about	  the	  productivity	  of	  water,	  and	  farmers	  could	  continue	  to	  apply	  water	  until	  the	  marginal	  product	  of	  that	  water	  was	  equal	  to	  zero.	  This	  measure	  of	  efficiency	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  use	  of	  other	  inputs.	  If	  a	  farmer	  adds	  more	  nitrogen	  as	  fertilizer,	  then	  the	  addition	  of	  water	  might	  be	  more	  productive	  than	  if	  there	  were	  no	  applied	  fertilizer	  (Sadras	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  Other	  important	  factors	  affect	  the	  productivity	  of	  water.	  An	  important	  underlying	  factor	  that	  affects	  water	  demand	  is	  the	  choice	  of	  crop	  that	  is	  planted,	  because	  some	  need	  more	  water	  than	  others	  (Martin	  et	  al.	  1993).	  For	  example,	  rice	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and	  cotton	  are	  far	  more	  water	  intensive	  than	  corn	  and	  wheat	  (Sadras	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  key	  difference	  between	  crops	  is	  the	  variation	  in	  rates	  of	  evapotranspiration.	  Evapotranspiration	  combines	  the	  concepts	  of	  evaporation	  and	  transpiration	  (water	  that	  is	  released	  to	  the	  air	  directly	  from	  the	  plants).	  Because	  it	  is	  often	  hard	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  when	  measuring	  the	  amount	  of	  water	  that	  is	  moved	  from	  the	  ground	  to	  the	  air,	  especially	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  lifetime	  of	  a	  crop,	  these	  concepts	  must	  be	  combined	  to	  help	  measure	  the	  overall	  water	  use	  of	  different	  crops.	  	  Besides	  the	  crop	  that	  is	  planted,	  a	  number	  of	  other	  factors	  affect	  the	  amount	  of	  evapotranspiration.	  Of	  these	  are	  climate	  and	  irrigation	  type	  (Martin	  et	  al.	  1993).	  There	  are	  known	  irrigation	  methods	  to	  limit	  the	  water	  delivered	  to	  given	  crop	  in	  order	  to	  get	  similar	  yields	  (Seo	  et	  al.	  2008).	  More	  precise	  irrigation	  techniques	  are	  more	  focused	  getting	  water	  to	  the	  plant,	  deliver	  water	  in	  lower	  quantities	  at	  one	  time,	  and	  can	  even	  be	  used	  to	  deliver	  water	  only	  at	  precise	  times	  when	  water	  is	  most	  needed.	  In	  other	  words,	  precision	  irrigation	  tries	  to	  limit	  the	  evaporation	  component	  of	  evapotranspiration,	  while	  focusing	  on	  using	  water	  where	  it	  is	  most	  productive.	  While	  precise	  irrigation	  techniques	  use	  less	  water	  to	  get	  similar	  yields,	  they	  often	  have	  higher	  initial	  fixed	  costs.	  	  Another	  potential	  strategy	  for	  reducing	  water	  demand	  is	  called	  deficit	  irrigation	  (Fereres	  and	  Soriano,	  2006).	  Deficit	  irrigation	  is	  the	  use	  of	  water	  below	  what	  is	  fully	  required	  by	  the	  crop	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  most	  value	  per	  unit	  of	  water.	  It	  is	  argued	  (but	  certainly	  not	  settled)	  that	  there	  is	  some	  potential	  for	  crops	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  water	  deficit,	  and	  thus	  would	  not	  harm	  yield	  or	  profits.	  Farmers	  may	  choose	  to	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engage	  in	  this	  risky	  behavior	  if	  have	  a	  desire	  to	  use	  water	  more	  sustainably	  and	  they	  are	  insured	  for	  losses.	  	  Finally,	  on	  a	  larger	  scale,	  much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  socially	  efficient	  use	  of	  groundwater	  (Rauscher,	  2007;	  Rubio	  and	  Casino,	  2001;	  Saak	  and	  Peterson,	  2007;	  Hellegers	  et	  al.	  2001).	  All	  of	  these	  note	  the	  common	  resource	  nature	  of	  groundwater,	  and	  suggest	  the	  need	  for	  different	  management	  systems.	  	  
Effects	  of	  crop	  insurance.	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  possible	  unforeseen	  consequences	  of	  crop	  insurance	  abound,	  though	  are	  largely	  inconclusive.	  The	  chief	  concerns	  of	  researchers	  and	  policymakers	  are	  related	  to	  adverse	  selection	  and	  moral	  hazard.	  Adverse	  selection	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  asymmetry	  of	  information	  that	  results	  in	  insured	  individuals	  being	  characteristically	  different	  from	  those	  who	  choose	  to	  be	  uninsured.	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  the	  insured	  individual	  knows	  more	  about	  the	  many	  unobservable	  factors	  about	  his	  or	  her	  farm	  than	  the	  insurer,	  he	  or	  she	  may	  have	  systematically	  different	  characteristics	  than	  those	  who	  are	  uninsured.	  Sherrick	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  found	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  a	  large	  sample	  of	  Midwestern	  farmers.	  Insured	  farmers	  tended	  to	  be	  less	  wealthy,	  larger,	  and	  more	  highly	  leveraged	  than	  uninsured	  farmer.	  This	  corroborates	  the	  findings	  of	  other	  studies	  examining	  the	  possibility	  of	  adverse	  selection	  in	  the	  crop	  insurance	  market	  (Makki	  and	  Somwaru	  2001;	  Luo,	  Skees,	  and	  Marchant	  1994).	  Apparent	  differences	  in	  behavior	  between	  insured	  and	  uninsured	  farmers	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  either	  adverse	  selection	  or	  moral	  hazard,	  which	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  distinguish.	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The	  moral	  hazard	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance	  has	  been	  studied	  for	  its	  possible	  implications	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  fertilizer	  and	  other	  chemical	  inputs	  have	  been	  used	  (Zhong,	  Ning,	  and	  Li,	  2007).	  	  Pesticides	  and	  fertilizer	  have	  different	  effects	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  insurance	  demanded	  (they	  assume	  an	  alternate	  direction	  of	  causality,	  with	  input	  use	  affecting	  the	  decision	  to	  purchase	  insurance).	  They	  contend,	  but	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  specific	  mechanism	  to	  explain,	  that	  fertilizers	  are	  risk	  increasing	  (offering	  higher	  yields	  with	  greater	  variability)	  and	  pesticides	  are	  risk	  reducing.	  It	  is	  plausible,	  then	  that	  a	  similar	  effect	  could	  show	  up	  in	  water	  use.	  This	  is,	  however,	  less	  likely	  because	  of	  the	  lower	  relative	  cost	  of	  water	  compared	  to	  fertilizers.	  	  Original	  moral	  hazard	  implications	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  through	  the	  intensive	  margin	  of	  agrochemical	  use,	  or	  how	  much	  chemical	  inputs	  are	  used.	  Horowitz	  and	  Lichtenberg	  (1993)	  found	  that	  insured	  farmers	  used	  more	  chemical	  inputs	  on	  their	  farms	  than	  uninsured	  farmers.	  This	  would	  have	  clear	  negative	  environmental	  effects	  through	  increased	  runoff	  pollution	  and	  all	  the	  associated	  damage	  therein	  (Tilman	  et	  al.	  2002).	  However,	  Smith	  and	  Goodwin	  (1996),	  found	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary	  using	  data	  from	  wheat	  production	  in	  Kansas.	  The	  authors	  argued	  that	  this	  finding	  was	  more	  in	  line	  with	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  insurance	  would	  cause	  farmers	  to	  use	  fewer	  chemical	  inputs	  on	  the	  margin.	  The	  model	  that	  they	  use	  suggests	  that	  chemical	  inputs	  are,	  in	  part,	  a	  risk	  management	  tool,	  which	  can	  be	  traded	  for	  insurance.	  A	  similar	  argument	  could	  be	  made	  for	  water.	  It	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  (over)use	  of	  irrigation	  water	  is	  in	  some	  instances	  a	  risk	  management	  technique,	  and	  that	  when	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  to	  avoid	  risk	  through	  insurance,	  less	  water	  is	  used.	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Another	  possible	  moral	  hazard	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance	  is	  through	  the	  extensive	  margin.	  That	  is,	  the	  behavior	  change	  that	  was	  witnessed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  insurance	  appeared	  through	  the	  vehicle	  of	  crop	  mix	  or	  how	  much	  land	  to	  plant.	  Claassen	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  show	  how	  crop	  insurance	  induced	  some	  farmers	  to	  convert	  pastureland	  to	  cropland.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  similar	  effect,	  crop	  insurance	  affecting	  what	  crops	  a	  farmer	  decides	  to	  plant,	  to	  occur,	  thus	  affecting	  overall	  water	  use.	  Furthermore,	  if	  crop	  insurance	  requires	  a	  history	  to	  become	  insured,	  then	  insurance	  may	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  farmers	  to	  switch	  crops.	  This	  may	  prevent	  a	  farmer	  from	  switching	  from	  a	  highly	  water	  intensive	  crop	  to	  a	  less	  water	  intensive	  crop,	  thus	  preventing	  a	  decline	  in	  overall	  water	  use.	  Wu	  (1999)	  found	  that	  in	  Nebraska,	  the	  availability	  of	  crop	  insurance,	  which	  was	  far	  more	  limited	  then	  in	  terms	  of	  crops	  that	  were	  covered,	  induced	  farmers	  to	  switch	  to	  increase	  corn	  production,	  resulting	  in	  greater	  agrochemical	  input	  use	  (because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  corn	  production	  as	  compared	  to	  hay	  or	  pasture).	  This	  may	  be	  less	  of	  a	  concern	  now	  that	  insurance	  programs	  cover	  more	  crops.	  Additionally,	  Chen	  (2005)	  found	  that	  acreage	  abandonment	  (measured	  by	  the	  percentage	  of	  acres	  harvested	  to	  acres	  planted)	  was	  greater	  among	  insured	  farmers	  in	  Texas	  (looking	  at	  three	  different	  counties).	  This	  change	  in	  land	  management	  suggests	  that	  less	  water	  would	  be	  used	  (but	  more	  wasted)	  than	  otherwise	  because	  there	  would	  be	  no	  effort	  to	  revive	  crops	  on	  abandoned	  land,	  resulting	  in	  less	  water	  requirements.	  	  Small	  yield	  effects	  of	  crop	  insurance	  have	  been	  observed	  in	  limited	  areas	  (Roberts,	  O’Donoghue,	  and	  Key	  2007).	  If	  a	  decision	  is	  made	  to	  plant	  less,	  or	  plant	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less	  intensively,	  then	  that	  could	  affect	  water	  use.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Corn	  Belt,	  Lobell	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  found	  that	  the	  use	  of	  new	  genetically	  modified	  crops	  allows	  for	  greater	  planting	  density,	  but	  that	  this	  also	  increases	  water	  use	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  drought.	  Sowing	  crops	  closer	  together	  allows	  for	  greater	  yields	  on	  average,	  but	  densely	  planted	  crops	  suffer	  more	  when	  the	  air	  is	  drier	  than	  crops	  planted	  with	  lower	  density.	  This	  intuitively	  makes	  sense.	  If	  we	  think	  of	  each	  plant	  as	  a	  small	  pump	  that	  moves	  water	  from	  the	  ground	  to	  the	  air	  through	  transpiration,	  having	  more	  plants	  will	  lead	  to	  less	  water	  immediately	  available	  for	  other	  plants.	  When	  plants	  are	  not	  planted	  so	  densely,	  there	  is	  less	  transpiration,	  and	  the	  shade	  they	  create	  between	  plants	  limits	  evaporation,	  and	  therefore	  more	  water	  for	  each	  plant.	  In	  times	  when	  there	  is	  water	  stress,	  on	  warm	  dry	  days,	  farmers	  must	  replenish	  the	  densely	  planted	  crops	  with	  more	  than	  they	  would	  for	  the	  more	  sparsely	  planted	  crops.	  The	  higher	  yield	  with	  higher	  risk	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  this	  trend	  in	  cropping	  density	  is	  exactly	  the	  behavior	  that	  we	  would	  expect	  insured	  individuals	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  of	  due	  to	  moral	  hazard.	  Finally,	  Walters	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  looked	  specifically	  for	  the	  four	  different	  environmental	  consequences	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  crop	  mixes	  because	  of	  crop	  insurance.	  They	  looked	  at	  four	  different	  environmental	  effects:	  wind	  and	  soil	  erosion	  and	  nitrogen	  loss	  and	  carbon	  loss,	  as	  well	  as	  acreage	  decisions,	  in	  four	  different	  regions:	  North	  Dakota,	  Iowa,	  Eastern	  Colorado,	  and	  Eastern	  Washington.	  The	  results	  they	  found	  were	  often	  limited,	  and	  were	  of	  different	  signs,	  suggesting	  weak	  and	  seemingly	  contradictory	  effects	  of	  crop	  insurance	  depending	  on	  region	  and	  environmental	  impacts.	  The	  benefit	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  they	  used	  farm	  level	  
	   20	  
data,	  and	  therefore	  were	  able	  to	  have	  more	  granularity	  enabling	  them	  to	  detect	  more	  nuanced	  changes	  that	  were	  not	  detectable	  at	  the	  county	  level.	  We	  should	  therefore	  be	  aware	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance	  may	  depend	  on	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  factors	  that	  are	  undetectable	  at	  larger	  levels	  of	  aggregation.	  Additionally,	  because	  the	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance	  varies,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  different	  specific	  effects	  in	  different	  regions,	  depending	  on	  what	  is	  a	  particular	  concern	  in	  different	  regions,	  such	  as	  water	  use	  in	  Texas.	  As	  described	  above,	  crop	  insurance	  can	  affect	  the	  use	  of	  water	  through	  a	  number	  of	  different	  mechanisms.	  If	  farmers	  use	  water	  as	  a	  risk	  abatement	  tool,	  then	  crop	  insurance	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  water	  use,	  resulting	  in	  lower	  water	  use.	  Alternatively,	  crop	  insurance	  may	  affect	  what	  to	  plant,	  how	  intensely	  to	  plant,	  or	  rates	  of	  abandonment,	  which	  may	  either	  increase	  or	  decrease	  water	  use.	  Finally,	  farmers	  may	  choose	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  water	  reducing	  methods	  such	  as	  deficit	  irrigation	  in	  order	  to	  conserve	  water	  while	  risking	  lower	  yields.	  These	  must	  all	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  as	  possibilities	  when	  analyzing	  the	  data.	  	  Theory	  To	  Equations	  	   Because	  the	  literature	  suggests	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  water	  demand	  could	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  positive	  or	  negative,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  get	  at	  an	  answer	  is	  to	  look	  at	  the	  data.	  The	  first	  equation	  that	  will	  be	  run	  to	  look	  into	  the	  effect	  of	  insurance	  on	  irrigation	  water	  use	  is	  a	  simple	  regression	  of	  the	  irrigation	  water	  use	  on	  overall	  level	  of	  insurance,	  with	  controls.	  Mathematically	  the	  equation	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒!,!,! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠!,!,! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛!,!,! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇	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Where	  WaterUse	  is	  measured	  in	  acre-­‐feet	  by	  crop	  by	  county	  and	  by	  year.	  Acres	  is	  the	  number	  of	  acres	  planted	  of	  each	  crop	  by	  county	  and	  by	  year.	  It	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  if	  more	  acres	  of	  a	  crop	  are	  planted,	  water	  use	  will	  likely	  increase.	  CropIn	  is	  measured	  by	  acres	  enrolled	  in	  crop	  insurance	  by	  crop	  by	  county	  and	  by	  year.	  One	  of	  the	  controls	  that	  must	  be	  accounted	  for	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  those	  counties	  that	  have	  pumping	  restrictions	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  North	  Plains	  Groundwater	  Conservation	  District	  in	  Texas	  from	  the	  years	  2005-­‐2012.	  In	  2005,	  the	  aforementioned	  district	  became	  the	  only	  groundwater	  conservation	  district	  in	  Texas	  to	  implement	  a	  limit	  on	  groundwater	  pumping	  to	  24	  inches	  per	  acre	  per	  year.	  This	  limit	  was	  increased	  in	  2012,	  which	  is	  outside	  our	  data	  range,	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  adjusted	  for	  twice.	  	  The	  other	  controls	  that	  we	  will	  use	  include	  rainfall	  and	  temperature.	  If	  it	  rains	  more	  in	  a	  given	  year,	  then	  we	  expect	  irrigated	  water	  use	  to	  be	  less	  because	  farmers	  do	  not	  need	  to	  add	  as	  much	  water	  to	  their	  crops	  in	  order	  to	  sate	  their	  thirst.	  Similarly,	  if	  it	  is	  warmer,	  we	  expect	  more	  water	  to	  be	  needed.	  According	  to	  Schlenker	  and	  Roberts	  (2009)	  there	  is	  a	  severe	  decrease	  in	  yields	  after	  temperature	  rises	  above	  29,	  30,	  and	  32	  degrees	  Celsius	  for	  Corn,	  Soybeans	  and	  Cotton	  respectively.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  until	  this	  threshold	  temperature	  is	  reached,	  a	  farmer	  may	  decide	  to	  wait	  and	  see	  if	  temperature	  falls	  or	  rain	  comes	  rather	  than	  watering.	  Once	  the	  temperature	  reaches	  this	  threshold	  level,	  it	  is	  increasingly	  likely	  that	  a	  farmer	  will	  either	  start	  using	  more	  water	  or	  risk	  the	  crop’s	  failure.	  Therefore,	  the	  more	  days	  in	  a	  year	  that	  cross	  this	  threshold	  temperature,	  and	  the	  higher	  above	  this	  threshold	  they	  are,	  the	  more	  water	  will	  likely	  be	  needed.	  To	  measure	  this,	  I	  use	  what	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are	  called	  degree-­‐days,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  temperature	  and	  our	  baseline	  temperature	  of	  29	  degrees	  Celsius	  across	  all	  days	  with	  a	  temperature	  above	  29	  degrees.	  	  I	  also	  add	  a	  timetrend	  to	  control	  for	  any	  other	  variations	  in	  demand	  that	  may	  have	  occurred	  throughout	  Texas	  such	  as	  changes	  in	  irrigation	  technology,	  other	  climatic	  factors,	  or	  pumping	  costs,	  that	  are	  not	  included	  explicitly	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  trend	  with	  time.	  We	  also	  may	  want	  to	  include	  county	  level	  fixed	  effects	  to	  control	  for	  regional	  variation	  of	  these	  extraneous	  factors.	  One	  concern	  is	  that	  if	  we	  include	  both	  year	  and	  county	  fixed	  effects,	  we	  may	  have	  an	  over-­‐determined	  equation,	  with	  both	  of	  those	  factors	  capturing	  all	  of	  other	  effects	  not	  included	  separately	  in	  our	  water	  demand	  equation.	  This	  will	  limit	  our	  overall	  understanding	  of	  the	  total	  effect	  of	  the	  crop	  insurance	  on	  its	  own.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  to	  include	  crop	  fixed	  effects	  because,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  different	  crops	  may	  require	  different	  quantities	  of	  water.	  Thus	  our	  equation	  becomes:	  𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒!,!,! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠!,!,!   +   𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛!,!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠+   𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙!,! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠!,! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦!+   𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝! +   𝛽!𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜇	  With	  all	  of	  these	  controls	  in	  our	  equation,	  we	  must	  be	  wary	  of	  over-­‐controlling.	  If	  we	  include	  factors	  through	  which	  crop	  insurance	  affects	  water	  use,	  then	  we	  are	  limiting	  the	  overall	  effect	  of	  the	  crop	  insurance	  as	  estimated	  by	  our	  equation.	  For	  example,	  if	  crop	  insurance	  does	  influence	  crop	  mix,	  then	  controlling	  for	  the	  type	  of	  crop	  will	  reduce	  the	  value	  of	  our	  coefficient	  on	  CropIn	  to	  just	  the	  direct	  effect	  on	  water	  use,	  and	  not	  its	  overall	  effect	  both	  through	  the	  intensity	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through	  which	  farmers	  use	  water	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  extensive	  margin	  of	  how	  much	  and	  what	  to	  grow.	  	  Data	  	   The	  data	  on	  levels	  of	  crop	  insurance	  comes	  from	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Agency.	  They	  provide	  county	  level	  data	  on	  “net	  reported	  acres”	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  total	  acres	  insured	  times	  the	  level	  insured	  (i.e.	  if	  100	  acres	  were	  insured	  at	  the	  75	  percent	  level,	  then	  “net	  reported	  acres”	  would	  be	  75)	  for	  the	  years	  1981-­‐2014.	  It	  also	  provides	  data	  on	  category	  of	  insurance	  (whether	  it	  was	  catastrophic	  coverage	  or	  greater),	  what	  crop	  was	  covered,	  type	  of	  plan	  (whether	  yield	  protection	  or	  revenue	  protection),	  and	  many	  other	  variables.	  The	  most	  important	  for	  this	  study	  is	  the	  value	  of	  net	  reported	  acres	  for	  each	  crop	  for	  each	  county.	  Data	  on	  irrigation	  water	  use	  comes	  from	  the	  Texas	  Water	  Development	  Board	  for	  each	  county	  and	  crop	  between	  the	  years	  1985-­‐2012.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  because	  these	  statistics	  are	  estimated,	  there	  are	  some	  data	  points	  for	  which	  the	  total	  acreage	  insured	  was	  listed	  as	  greater	  than	  the	  total	  acreage	  planted.	  For	  these	  points,	  I	  adjusted	  the	  acres	  insured	  to	  reflect	  the	  number	  of	  acres	  planted.	  Estimates	  of	  total	  acreage	  planted	  and	  harvested	  of	  various	  crops	  in	  the	  various	  counties	  come	  from	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Agriculture’s	  National	  Agricultural	  Statistics	  Service.	  The	  crops	  that	  overlap	  in	  these	  three	  databases	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  are	  included	  in	  this	  study,	  and	  are	  as	  follows:	  corn,	  cotton,	  sorghum,	  peanuts,	  rice,	  soybeans,	  and	  wheat.	  Finally,	  data	  on	  average	  precipitation	  and	  temperature	  for	  each	  county	  and	  year	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  Center	  for	  Disease	  Control’s	  WONDER	  (Wide-­‐ranging	  Online	  Data	  for	  Epidemiologic	  Research)	  database.	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Figure	  1	  shows	  a	  general	  picture	  of	  how	  overall	  levels	  of	  insurance	  coverage	  have	  changed	  over	  the	  years.	  It	  shows	  the	  average	  “net	  reported	  acres”	  insured	  across	  all	  Texas	  counties	  for	  the	  years	  1981	  to	  2014.	  One	  can	  see	  the	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  insured	  acres	  following	  the	  1994	  reform	  act.	  Water	  use,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  far	  more	  variable	  (Figure	  2),	  owing	  in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  weather.	  Only	  through	  regression	  analysis,	  controlling	  for	  various	  factors	  described	  above,	  can	  we	  learn	  the	  specific	  effect	  crop	  insurance	  had	  on	  water	  use.	  	  Results	  	   Table	  1a	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  the	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  (OLS)	  regressions	  based	  on	  equations	  above.	  Columns	  1	  only	  includes	  crop	  fixed	  effects,	  column	  2	  adds	  a	  timetrend	  to	  control	  for	  any	  other	  variables	  that	  trend	  with	  time	  that	  are	  not	  included	  explicitly	  in	  the	  model,	  such	  as	  technological	  progress,	  and	  column	  3	  includes	  both	  a	  timetrend	  and	  county	  fixed	  effects.	  Some	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  our	  expectations,	  while	  others	  are	  more	  surprising.	  We	  find	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  acres	  planted	  (or	  harvested)	  and	  water	  use	  of	  about	  0.3.	  In	  other	  words,	  and	  increase	  in	  one	  acre	  of	  land	  should	  result	  in	  an	  increased	  use	  of	  0.3	  acre-­‐feet	  of	  water.	  Rainfall	  is	  only	  statistically	  significant	  when	  county	  fixed	  effects	  are	  not	  included.	  However,	  when	  statistically	  significant,	  it	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  as	  expected,	  signifying	  that	  increased	  rainfall	  reduces	  the	  demand	  for	  water.	  We	  can	  also	  see	  in	  Table	  1b,	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  degree-­‐days	  increases	  overall	  water	  use	  as	  expected.	  It	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  higher	  more	  frequently	  the	  temperature	  is	  above	  29°C	  should	  increase	  the	  demand	  for	  water	  if	  farmers	  are	  trying	  to	  keep	  their	  crops	  from	  being	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severely	  damaged.	  In	  column	  1	  of	  table	  1a,	  we	  see	  a	  negative	  coefficient	  for	  degree-­‐days.	  However,	  this	  goes	  away	  after	  we	  control	  for	  county	  fixed	  effects.	  	  	  Most	  interestingly,	  the	  correlation	  between	  crop	  insurance	  and	  the	  level	  of	  water	  use,	  the	  relationship	  of	  interest,	  is	  contrary	  to	  we	  might	  expect	  from	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  literature.	  I	  found	  that,	  holding	  other	  factors	  constant,	  an	  increase	  of	  one	  insured	  acre	  is	  associated	  with	  roughly	  a	  0.2	  acre-­‐foot	  increase	  in	  water	  use.	  	  Results	  were	  statistically	  significant	  in	  all	  specifications	  of	  our	  model	  at	  the	  one	  percent	  level	  (i.e.	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  value	  being	  zero,	  meaning	  no	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance,	  is	  less	  than	  one	  percent).	  This	  is	  a	  large	  result.	  0.2	  acre-­‐feet	  is	  equal	  to	  about	  65,000	  gallons	  of	  water.	  When	  considering	  that	  there	  are	  over	  8.3	  million	  acres	  insured	  in	  Texas	  in	  2012,	  this	  translates	  into	  an	  increase	  in	  water	  consumption	  by	  1.6	  million	  acre-­‐feet,	  or	  enough	  for	  roughly	  3	  million	  households	  in	  a	  given	  year,	  solely	  due	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance.	  Results	  of	  the	  panel	  model	  confirm	  this	  number.	  Results	  also	  vary	  widely	  by	  crop,	  with	  corn	  and	  rice	  using	  relatively	  more	  water,	  and	  the	  other	  crops	  using	  less	  (wheat	  least	  of	  all).	  To	  find	  the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  crop	  insurance	  affects	  water	  use,	  I	  simulated	  Chen’s	  (2005)	  study	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  insurance	  on	  abandonment	  rates	  using	  this	  data	  set	  and	  similar	  equation.	  This	  data	  confirms	  Chen’s	  results,	  in	  that	  a	  one	  acre	  increase	  in	  insured	  area	  led	  to	  a	  .02	  acre	  increase	  in	  area	  abandoned.	  This	  makes	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  we	  would	  expect	  moral	  hazard	  to	  operate	  through	  crop	  insurance.	  With	  more	  land	  insured,	  there	  is	  less	  pressure	  to	  put	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  try	  to	  guarantee	  the	  harvest	  of	  marginal	  lands.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  decrease	  the	  demand	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for	  water,	  but	  further	  studies	  may	  be	  interested	  to	  know	  other	  possible	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  unharvested	  acres.	  	  I	  also	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  increased	  water	  use	  was	  due	  to	  increased	  planting	  intensity,	  following	  the	  work	  of	  Lobell	  et	  al.	  (2014).	  This	  was	  true	  of	  corn,	  sorghum,	  peanuts,	  and	  soybeans,	  and	  had	  almost	  no	  effect	  on	  cotton,	  rice,	  or	  wheat.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  cultivars	  have	  been	  developed	  for	  farmers	  to	  increase	  the	  planting	  intensity	  of	  some	  crops	  but	  not	  others.	  Table	  1b	  shows	  the	  results	  when	  controlling	  for	  abandonment,	  increased	  intensity,	  and	  both.	  On	  the	  aggregate	  level	  shown	  in	  the	  table,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  effect	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  intensity.	  However,	  when	  limited	  to	  just	  those	  crops	  that	  are	  most	  affected	  by	  intensive	  planting,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  production	  intensity	  explains	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  water	  use	  due	  to	  crop	  insurance.	  	  To	  see	  if	  there	  are	  regional	  differences	  in	  this	  effect,	  I	  divided	  the	  data	  according	  to	  the	  10	  climate	  regions	  in	  Texas	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  National	  Weather	  Service	  (Figure	  3).	  Tables	  2a	  and	  2b	  show	  the	  results	  of	  these	  regressions	  (I	  included	  both	  county	  fixed	  effects	  and	  a	  timetrend).	  	  Results	  were	  strongest	  in	  the	  High	  Plains	  and	  Trans-­‐Pecos,	  which	  overlie	  the	  Ogallala	  and	  Edwards	  aquifers,	  respectively.	  Interestingly,	  the	  results	  were	  a	  lot	  closer	  to	  0,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  negative,	  showing	  that	  insurance	  may	  in	  fact	  lead	  to	  lower	  uses	  of	  water	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  South	  Texas,	  which	  have	  a	  different	  relationship	  with	  water.	  	  	  Conclusion	  	   Unlike	  many	  previous	  studies	  on	  the	  potential	  impacts	  that	  crop	  insurance	  has	  on	  various	  decisions	  relating	  to	  the	  environment	  or	  sustainability,	  this	  study	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found	  significant	  and	  strong	  results	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  insurance	  on	  water	  use	  in	  Texas.	  I	  was	  also	  able	  to	  confirm	  the	  results	  of	  previous	  studies	  done	  by	  Chen	  (2005)	  and	  Lobell	  et	  al.	  (2014).	  While	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  entire	  increase	  in	  water	  use,	  much	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  increased	  planting	  intensity	  for	  certain	  crops	  in	  certain	  regions.	  	   Freshwater	  is	  a	  vitally	  important	  resource	  that	  we	  need	  to	  conserve	  if	  we	  are	  going	  to	  sustain	  growing	  populations	  in	  the	  future.	  Yet	  without	  access	  to	  water,	  we	  cannot	  grow	  the	  crops	  we	  need	  to	  feed	  ourselves.	  While	  other	  policies,	  such	  as	  pumping	  restrictions	  or	  water	  pricing	  mechanisms,	  are	  more	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  limiting	  of	  groundwater	  to	  sustainable	  levels,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  that	  other	  policies	  that	  govern	  such	  a	  heavy	  water	  user	  affect	  water	  use	  in	  a	  large	  way.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  Texas	  where	  laws	  that	  limit	  the	  use	  of	  groundwater	  are	  either	  in	  a	  very	  nascent	  phase	  or	  nonexistent.	  Knowing	  that	  crop	  insurance	  has	  this	  effect	  on	  water	  use,	  policy	  makers	  at	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Agency	  should	  pilot	  efforts	  to	  govern	  how	  much	  water	  insured	  farmers	  use,	  so	  that	  there	  will	  be	  enough	  water	  for	  both	  current	  and	  future	  generations	  to	  enjoy.	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  Figure	  1	  
	  Source:	  Risk	  Management	  Agency	  	  Figure	  2	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Figure	  3:	  Texas	  Climate	  Divisions	  
	  Source:	  National	  Agricultural	  Statistics	  Service	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Table	  1a	      
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet 
        
Constant 57,287.15*** 17,344.13*** 17,113.39*** 
 
(26.149) (3.240) (3.148) 
Acres Insured 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 
 
(5.220) (9.503) (9.216) 
Acres Planted 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 
 
(14.646) (13.909) (12.334) 
Limits -8,735.36*** 1,484.56 1,757.49 
 
(-3.391) (0.491) (0.578) 
Avg Daily Precipitation -11,009.42*** -1,099.20 -871.06 
(mm) (-23.208) (-1.540) (-1.200) 
Degree-days -20.44*** 0.11 1.53 
 
(-16.513) (0.058) (0.766) 
Crop Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Timetrend   Y 
County Fixed Effects  Y Y 
    
Observations 8,953 8,953 8,953 
R-squared 0.486 0.668 0.668 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    Table	  1b	      
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet 
        
Constant 14,336.66*** 19,746.70*** 21,000.30*** 
 
(2.712) (3.889) (4.105) 
Acres Insured 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 
(9.608) (10.208) (10.161) 
Acres Planted 0.02 -0.01 0.05* 
 
(0.606) (-0.369) (1.935) 
Limits 2,632.31 2,385.95 2,138.98 
 
(0.875) (0.732) (0.650) 
Avg Daily Precipitation -971.55 -1,036.42 -1,017.63 
(mm) (-1.345) (-1.553) (-1.534) 
Degree-days 5.55*** 9.62*** 8.89*** 
 
(2.799) (5.205) (4.800) 
Control for Abandonment Y  Y 
Control for Intensity  Y Y 
    
Observations 8,953 8,952 8,952 
R-squared 0.680 0.723 0.724 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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  Table	  2a	  
     










VARIABLES Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet 
            
Constant 47,960.27*** -15,260.70* -4,476.90*** 16,001.05*** 1,932.96** 
 
(9.576) (-1.881) (-3.551) (4.177) (2.287) 
Acres Insured 0.28*** 0.81** 0.02*** 0.01 0.04*** 
 
(8.879) (2.093) (3.472) (0.174) (4.212) 
Acres Planted 0.32*** 2.33*** 0.02*** 0.26*** -0.02*** 
 
(12.039) (7.373) (4.160) (6.345) (-2.812) 
Avg Daily Precipitation -3,283.89* -4,233.04 -295.68 -772.71 -297.57* 
(mm) (-1.780) (-1.199) (-1.131) (-0.997) (-1.673) 
Degree-days 0.47 8.28 2.30** -0.30 -0.41 
 
(0.096) (0.690) (2.293) (-0.107) (-0.783) 
      
Observations 3,511 203 1,533 608 642 
R-squared 0.711 0.811 0.518 0.621 0.040 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      	  	  	  	  	  	   Table	  2b	  





Texas East Texas 
Upper 
Coast Lower Valley 
VARIABLES Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet Acre-Feet 
            
Constant -75,003.82*** -98.51 -3,973.14* -25,629.98* 18,117.90 
 
(-5.558) (-0.033) (-1.879) (-1.798) (0.836) 
Acres Insured -0.11** -0.23*** 0.35** -0.31 0.05 
 
(-2.121) (-2.799) (2.379) (-1.059) (0.338) 
Acres Planted 0.23*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 1.22*** 0.45*** 
 
(3.991) (4.653) (3.690) (4.777) (3.033) 
Avg Daily Precipitation  73.03 202.51 -50.90 -1,240.06 526.03 
(mm) (0.088) (0.340) (-0.116) (-0.480) (0.090) 
Degree-days 5.24* 2.79 0.29 8.52 30.27 
 
(1.810) (1.598) (0.216) (0.651) (1.307) 
      
Observations 819 489 310 590 248 
R-squared 0.799 0.633 0.735 0.659 0.496 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      	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